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Hitler’s Legacy vs. Bolshevist-Communism’s Legacy Germany and Russia: A Comparative Analysis of Two Political Cultures [Updated June, 2006]
Why is it that certain countries have developed economically, and others, have not? Take Germany and Russia for instance. Both countries have had experience with nationalism, both countries have had successful political and economic systems in place, at one time or another, in their respective pasts, both countries have experienced some form of totalitarianism, and both countries are rich in both human and natural resources. These two countries are not so different; so how has Germany become an economic ‘powerhouse (the fifth largest in the world),’ while Russia has become an economic disaster? Is Bolshevism-Communism to blame? Is the lax socialist work ethic to blame for Russia’s economic woes?
Germany has developed—albeit via U.S. coercion, possibly against its national will—into a well-adjusted, capitalist economic power, while Russia certainly has not. I would like to set about discovering why this is the case by focusing my analysis on one specific, but extremely important, socio-political factor; that being political culture. It is difficult to pinpoint, or isolate, only one socio-political factor that has contributed to such a drastic economic rift between these two European countries, but it is my attempt to demonstrate how political culture can either make or break a nation-state’s economy.
Germany’s economic success implies that its norms, values, work ethic, and political philosophies are superior and quite flexible-adaptable—driven by positive forces—which, has clearly worked to the advantage of the entire German economy.
This picture can be painted more lucidly by focusing on just three key areas that will serve to at least partially explain why Germany has triumphed economically, and Russia has not. The three interwoven issues I would like to focus on analyzing, in detail, are as follows: 1) political economy; 2) work ethic; and 3) the commitment to a democratic form of self-governance.
These three key components will be analyzed within a comparative context, in order to illustrate some of the crucial differences between German and Russian political culture, so that we may come to better understand why Germany has had a much more successful economy than that or Russia.
However, we cannot begin to compare, or analyze, the present political cultures of these two nation-states, without first acknowledging their respective historiographies. Historical context is imperative to the correct understanding of the modern-day political culture of any given nation-state.
In the case of Russia, every capitalist venture has collapsed under relentless pressure, either from the masses or, from contention within the government itself. The ethnic Russian masses had been indoctrinated, if not coerced, to embrace Bolshevist-Communism, as numerous political crises had ensued since the final days of Marxism-Leninism. A period of war Communism was followed, in the early 1920s, by a partial retreat from Bolshevik principles. The New Economic Policy permitted certain types of private economic activity, so that the country might recover more quickly from the ravages of civil war. But the interval [possibly the first inklings of Russian capitalism] was cut short by the death of Lenin in 1924.
The gradual ascension of Stalin, and the Jewish-Soviet Commissars, to power by the mid-1920s, eventually brought an end to the liberalization of society and the economy, leading instead to a period of unprecedented, totalitarian-style governmental control (Encylopaedia Britannica, p. 106, 107).
While Russia was contending with terrorism on a massive scale under Stalin’s state-driven Communism, Germany was still flirting with a tangible, democratic—though grossly ineffectual—form of government known as the Weimar Republic (1919-1933).
The German people were able to vote for members of the Reichstag (Lower House), and the German states (Lander) were able to elect members to the Bundesrat (Upper House) (Palmer, p. 140).
Russians, in the meantime, were being terrorized and collectivized on a daily basis by the Stalin regime. His brutal efforts to centralize agriculture and industry in the 1930s restricted Russian culture and eliminated the lives of thousands of individuals deemed dangerous to the Soviet State (http://www.cia.gov).
Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan called for rapid industrialization (Russia already lagged far behind the modernity of Europe and the United States) (Jones, p. 26). Small-scale industry and services were nationalized, managers strove to fulfill Gosplan’s output quotas, and trade unions were transformed into mechanisms for increasing worker productivity. But, because Stalin insisted on unrealistic production targets, serious problems soon came to the fore.
Widespread shortages of commodities and services occurred, and inflation skyrocketed. Stalin’s subsequent Five-Year Plans resulted in forced collectivization of agriculture, and eventually widespread and unprecedented famine, social unrest, and a demoralized, terror-stricken proletariat. By 1932, the Bolshevist-Communist Russian economy and society were both under severe strain (http://reference.allrefer.com).
On the other hand, Germany had a vivacious form of Triumphal Nationalism brewing, and their leader had declared a holy war against the “evils” of Communism—that is, against the Bolshevist Soviet Union (Jones, p. 30).
Hitler, supported en masse by the German people, and backed by a vast network of sympathetic capitalist elites, like Fritz Thyssen, had transformed Germany into an economic miracle-worker; unprecedented for the time and, remains to this day, unsurpassed with regards to its speed and success. Indeed, it was Hitler who had rejuvenated and re-instilled the incredible German work ethic, as he had not only imparted unto the masses an intense nationalistic fervor but, furthermore, a sense of collective superiority (Payne, p. 257, 258). In all probability, it was he and his Nazi-Sozis who most influenced the Germany of today and, Stalin and his Jewish Commissars, who most influenced the Russia of today.
Now that we have examined a brief history of both countries to gain a better understanding of the socio-political climate from whence their respective economies emerged, we can now turn our attention to the present German and Russian political-cultural attributes. I will begin with an integrated discussion of political economy and work ethic.
The German political economy consists of cooperative labor, management, and ownership. This system is often referred to as codetermination. The German labor force, unlike the stagnant workforce of Russia, has as much of a culture as does German management.
Many workers regard themselves as serious professionals with a vested interest in their company/ies, hence, they are treated very well. German workers have consistently had the highest level of education of any group of workers in Europe. Worker training usually lasts two to three years, and may even last longer for highly specialized vocations (Gomulka, p. 71, 72). The philosophy governing the expenditure of time and money was articulated by the head of personnel at Volkswagen, who said, “Training costs money; not to train costs a great deal more money.”
Germany also has the highest share of world trade in goods with a high skill content: 20%, as against 17% in Japan, 15% for the U.S., and 7% for France. In fact, many of (West) Germany’s labor traditions have moved smoothly to (Eastern) Germany since unification (Arthur, p. 116). Vocational training already existed in the (former) GDR, and labor in former East Germany was not as inefficient as its management, or as the often antiquated production machinery. Therefore, although there have been problems with adjustment, especially for the older workers in the former East who were not accustomed to the pace of a modern production site, on the whole the eastern labor force has adapted well (http://www.reference.allrefer.com).
If this was the case for the former GDR, then why has the Russian labor force been unable to adjust to the capitalist pace as well? If the former Soviet East German workers could do it, then certainly the Russians could do it as well. Part of this discrepancy may be explained by Yeltsin’s implementation of “shock therapy,” which aimed to push the newly democratized Russia into capitalism faster than it could politically or economically handle (Palmer, p. 237). West Germany had been extremely patient with the readjustment of East Germany, sometimes in the West’s view, too patient, with regard to its transition to a functional capitalist entity (Coricelli, p. 89).
The Russian economy has certainly grown and has made immeasurable progress in economic production and diversification since the collapse of the Soviet Union but, the workforce remains unmotivated, and the overall state of the economy in Russia has remained stagnant, from the perspective of the West (http://www.cia.gov).
Russian citizens in the Soviet Union were brought up in an economic system that, whatever its failings, provided them with a great deal of socio-economic security. Their standard of living was far below that of the West, but people had decent jobs and enough food to eat (Palmer, p. 237).
Under communist-socialism, providing jobs was more important than making a profit, and most Soviet factories had far more workers than they needed. If a factory did not make a profit, the government merely had to provide subsidies to keep it afloat. Soviet workers also had little incentive to work hard; their wages were low, and raises and other benefits were more or less automatic. With the transition to capitalism, Russian firms would need to shed workers and become profitable. Excess employees would be laid-off and unprofitable firms closed down. Job security and the cradle-to-grave social-welfare system would also become relics of the past. The harsh side of capitalism, then, was a source of grave concern to many Russians, who, while welcoming some of the perks of a capitalist lifestyle, were reluctant to jeopardize the economic safety net provided by socialism (Bernstam, Rabushka, p. 112). Hence, it was only sensible for the Russian electorate to have used its newfound democratic freedom to vote for the continuation of socialism. Capitalism would have to prove its utility in a hurry in Russia, or suffer the consequences. This is still the current socio-political drama that has afflicted the Russian capitalist transition since the dissolution of the USSR (Palmer, p. 237). If there can be no compromise amongst the Russian people and its leadership, there can be no success for a true capitalist state.
Gorbachev’s astounding efforts to implement capitalism in Russia, both peacefully and carefully, had failed, as his policies of Glasnost and Perestroika were quickly undermined by a horrifically devastated economy. Upon the collapse of the USSR, Russia never saw the measure of aid or foreign intervention that Germany had seen after World War II, and according to author Palmer, Gorbachev [and the Russian people] were “left to drown [by Reagan] in a sea of political and economic despair.” The “shock therapy” implemented by Yeltsin had also failed to rejuvenate and capitalize the Russian economy (http://www.allrefer.com). Unlike Russia, Germany was aided by the United States during reconstruction following World War II, thus, has been able to attain the ideal version of state capitalism, being that of growth and equity (Palmer, p. 31). Russia has not been able to achieve equity even though it has witnessed tremendous growth (Coricelli, p. 116).
I think that it is very important, at this point, to bring up the fact that Germany has a Constitution that has been carefully crafted by a democratic and capitalist nation—the U.S.
Russia never had this advantage, or the support to the same degree, due to its Communist allegiance and totalitarian-style leadership. Though, this is staunch bigotry on the part of the U.S., as the U.S. had supported Communism when it found it expedient to do so (during World War II). This strange duality in U.S. foreign policy may have well been the result of Jewish-Zionist political and economic influence in America however, this still needs to be thoroughly investigated before arriving at any definitive conclusions.
Russia was borne out of a state of collapse and has never been able to fully recover from the economic and political devastation wrought by Stalin and his Jewish-Bolshevist Commissars, or its involvement in the Cold War. Perhaps the anti-capitalist sentiment and poorly developed economy of Russia’s recent past best explains why Russia has failed to democratize and capitalize to the extent to which Germany has. It certainly seems plausible when one takes into consideration the fact that Germany had already had the capitalist base from which to draw, with the former Weimar Republic and Third Reich Hitler government (Payne, p. 345, 347). Both of these German governments were capitalist-based economies, which contributed to the early economic edge that Germany had over Russia.
I would now like to focus solely on the present by discussing the commitment to a capitalist-democracy, proposed by both countries, to further advance my comparative analysis.
Germany has accomplished its successful transition from an authoritarian-style republic to a democratic, capitalist-based democracy. This situation is not entirely unlike that of Russia. The Russians have also caste off their authoritarian legacy, but they have yet to collectively embrace a true capitalist economy (Jones, p. 238). Some experts have gone on to argue that since the ascension of Vladimir Putin, efforts to democratize and capitalize have slipped even further from possibility (Christian Science Monitor).
Putin announced that seats in the Duma (Russia’s national parliament), allocated to single-member constituencies, be replaced by a fully proportional system. The move, “could see the few remaining independent voices forced out of the federal parliament,” reported The Globe and Mail of Canada.
Stanislav Belkovsky, head of the Institute of National Strategy, told the Russian daily, Vedomosti, that Putin’s reforms would be no more successful than other attempts to consolidate power, reports Reuters. The Financial Times went on to state that, “Putin took a chainsaw to the fragile roots of Russian democracy. Once it has begun, the advance of authoritarianism is hard to stop, especially in a country with weak democratic traditions. Mr. Putin need only glance at Russia’s own history to see how dramatic the dangers can be” (Christian Science Monitor).
At the same time, Russia’s economy is becoming more and more dependent on foreign investment, [much like that the United States currently in 2006], multilateral loan agencies, and rescheduling of foreign debt. Privatization is nearly complete, but has had some trouble with political opposition to the transformation of large state firms. Most prices are heavily influenced by the fluctuations of the market. The role of organized crime is significant, and much economic activity is officially unaccounted for (http://reference.allrefer.com). All of these factors are coming together to challenge the Russian commitment to democracy and a capitalist economy.
Germany never had the chance to draft its own constitution, as the U.S. and its allies quickly fulfilled that duty to make certain Germany would never have to experience the troubles that Russia has been experiencing all along. The German commitment to democracy is profound and the likelihood of an authoritarian-style government has, in all likelihood, been lost to history like its National Socialist past. Their state capitalist economic system accepts the proposition that capitalist competition is the most effective way to generate economic growth. The basic formula of state capitalism calls for most economic activity to be in the hands of individual capitalists (Palmer, p. 31). The workers still benefit from the inherited social network of benefits, services and nationalized healthcare. That is to say, Germany is not a full-blown market economy, because it has successfully retained some of its socialist policies from its National Socialist past. This system allows Germany to prosper with the rest of the First World capitalist powers as a true champion of economic prosperity and democratic principles.
The socialist background inherited from a seething past of Czarist and Bolshevik-Communist authoritarianism has not allowed for the development of a free market economy or, the democratic transition of modern day Russia; but, Russia is not without hope. Socialism is not necessarily synonymous with government type, as we have seen in the German state capitalist model, and it may be feasible for Russia to adapt that same kind of state capitalist framework; without sacrificing the support of its people.
The people want the social guarantees afforded them by the Communism of yesterday, but they also need to push their capitalist transformation to a new height if they wish to attain the status set forth by the great Western powers like Germany. Russia does not need to divorce itself from socialism, as some degree of socialism is most desirable and necessary, but it will need to allow for adjustments to its current political economy, work ethic, and commitment to democratic principles to make this come to fruition. Russia must work to bring its people together as a collective force to undermine the negativity and anti-capitalist forces that have instilled fear into the populace for so many years.
Are Germans starving, hopeless, and deprived of a network of goods and services for the sake of capitalism? Of course not, so, why should Russia expect or accept anything less? Dismantling a statist-socialist economic system does not necessarily result in the birth of a free market economy. Socialism can assimilate and adapt, and transform into a new and different kind of socialism (Bernstam, Rabushka, p. 113).
This form of socialism can be seen in Australia, Germany, Japan, France, and the United States, and numerous other capitalist nation-states. Therefore, Russia could certainly be in a league with the rest of these nations if it willed it to be so.
Bibliography
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2. Brian W. Arthur. “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events,” Economic Journal 99 (1989): 116-118.
3. Clark, Matthew. “Putin’s Grip.” Christians Science Monitor 14 Sep. 2004. 15 Sep. 2004 http://www.csmonitor.com.
4. Coricelli, Fabrizio. Macroeconomic Policies and the Development of Markets in Transition Economies. Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998.
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